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THE WARS OF THE JUDGES
Stephen I. Vladeck ∗
INTRODUCTION
Professor Anderson’s timely and trenchant study of “judicial
lobbying” opens with an important vignette: the controversial role
played by Judge John Bates in the surveillance reform debate sparked by
the June 2013 disclosures by Edward Snowden. 1 The episode arose
during Congress’s consideration of different bills (the final version of
which ended up as law in the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015) 2 to reform
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the specialized
court—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)—that hears
cases arising under FISA. 3 One of the central procedural elements of the
reform effort was the proposal to introduce a “special advocate”—a
security-cleared lawyer who could stake out and vigorously defend a
position adversarial to the government in what were usually ex parte
judicial proceedings. 4 And although Judge Bates also objected to other
elements of the reforms (including proposals to require more
transparency in FISC decisions), the “special advocate” proposal
certainly appeared to be his central target.
To that end, Judge Bates took the initiative to send at least three (and
perhaps more) letters to Congress objecting to various aspects of the
different reform bills. His objections included both procedural and
substantive critiques that evolved as the proposals made their way
through the legislative process. The last of Judge Bates’s public letters
* Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. J. Jonas Anderson, Judicial Lobbying, 91 WASH. L. REV. 401, 402–03 (2016).
2. Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline
Over Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015).
3. For a general discussion of the FISC and its centrality to the post-Snowden reform
conversation, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and Article III, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1161 (2015).
4. See generally CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE CASE FOR A FISA “SPECIAL ADVOCATE” (2014),
http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/The-Case-for-a-FISA-SpecialAdvocate_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/J49S-ANL4]. For an elegant and powerful defense of the
value of such adversarial participation before the typically ex parte FISC, see ACLU v. Clapper, 785
F.3d 787, 829–31 (2d Cir. 2015) (Sack, J., concurring).
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was written in August 2014. 5 By that time, the Obama administration
had acquiesced in a compromise bill introduced by Senator Patrick
Leahy. 6 Thus, it is no exaggeration to suggest that Judge Bates had
become the legislation’s most visible and outspoken opponent, at least
beyond Capitol Hill. Given how weak the final version of the USA
FREEDOM Act turned out to be (especially the provisions that were the
focus of Judge Bates’s critiques), 7 there is little doubt that his efforts
were successful, even if they were also inappropriate.
In the interest of full disclosure, I am not a disinterested party. As
Professor Anderson’s footnotes attest, 8 I was one of the loudest public
critics of Judge Bates’s involvement in the FISA reform debate—with
respect to both the procedural and substantive implications of his
actions. I have also long been (and remain) one of the strongest
proponents of participation of a special advocate in at least a subset of
the cases heard by the FISA Court. 9 And my support for the latter reform
is certainly not unrelated to the former critique. But leaving the
substance of the special advocate debate for other fora, I want to
amplify, in two different ways, Professor Anderson’s excellent article,
which I hope all federal judges will read.

5. Letter from Hon. John D. Bates, Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to Hon. Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Aug. 5, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/Leahyletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/P37M-7AE2].
6. See Spencer Ackerman, Obama-Backed Surveillance Reform Bill Introduced in US Senate,
GUARDIAN (July 29, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/29/obama-surveillancereform-bill-us-senate [https://perma.cc/X3EW-WHL9].
7. As I wrote shortly before the final bill was passed,
[T]he far larger problem [with the final bill] is the “special advocate” provision, which,
compared to earlier proposals, have [sic] been watered down to a fare-thee-well. Now, instead
of guaranteeing the presence of an outside lawyer to argue against the government whenever
the government seeks new authority, or a new interpretation of an existing authority, the matter
is committed to the discretion of the FISA Court, which can decline to appoint such an
“amicus” at its own discretion. Just to cut to the chase, this is merely codifying the status
quo—where FISA Court judges were already perfectly within their rights to appoint amici
when appropriate, and to not do so when not. All the bill really does is add some (secret)
paperwork.
Steve Vladeck, How Rand Paul Hijacked Surveillance Reform, JUST SECURITY (June 1, 2015),
https://www.justsecurity.org/23353/rand-paul-hijacked-surveillance-reform/
[https://perma.cc/2W89-A4XF].
8. Anderson, supra note 1, at 403 n.7 (citing Steve Vladeck, Judge Bates (Unintentionally) Makes
the Case for FISC Reform, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/
13816/judge-bates-fisc-reform/ [https://perma.cc/62VD-B5UZ]).
9. I first started arguing for a “special advocate” just over one month after the Snowden
disclosures. See Steve Vladeck, Making FISC More Adversarial: A Brief Response to Orin Kerr,
LAWFARE (July 8, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/making-fisc-more-adversarial-briefresponse-orin-kerr [https://perma.cc/QA3T-WJGE].
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First, in my view, Professor Anderson’s story actually understates the
problems with Judge Bates’s role in the FISA reform debate. As I will
show, Judge Bates’s role far exceeded in both its form and its substance
the roles played by federal judges in the other examples Professor
Anderson recounts. Second, it provoked a rather testy—and pointed—
response from a number of his fellow federal judges, including Judge
Alex Kozinski, then the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit (and as such, a
member of the Judicial Conference of the United States). 10 Although
federal judges are hardly immune from snarking at each other, it should
go without saying that when these non-substantive kerfuffles are
splashed across newspaper headlines, it can demean the public
perception of the integrity and impartiality of the federal courts.
Judges are at their best when they are sharply debating the finer points
of particular legal issues. That being said, it is clear that when these
debates exceed the scope of academia or jurisprudence, the public
attention they draw does little other than undermine the prestige of the
courts and the legitimacy of their counter-majoritarian decisions.
Especially at this moment in our history, with a President who has
publicly sought to undermine the role of the courts, 11 these kinds of hits
to the public credibility of the judiciary are something we can ill afford.
Ultimately, Professor Anderson is correct in concluding that the
unique relationship between judges and the specialized courts on which
they sit provides critical insights into the virtues and vices of judicial
lobbying. With Professor Anderson’s helpful context in mind, my
response is intended to offer a more modest and specific thesis: that the
FISA reform episode was a singularly extreme example of judicial
intervention in policymaking, and one that should concern even those
less troubled than Professor Anderson by the specter of judicial
lobbying.
I.

THE UNIQUENESS OF THE FISA REFORM EXAMPLE

Let me start with what should be obvious, but which ought to be said
anyway: Judge Bates is an exceptionally bright, thoughtful, and diligent
jurist. Indeed, I have long been a fan of his opinions—even in cases in

10. See Letter from Hon. Alex Kozinski, C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to
Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Aug. 14, 2014), http://images.politico.
com/global/2014/08/20/kozinski_to_leahy.html [https://perma.cc/6LP7-KFJ4].
11. See Editorial, After Mr. Trump’s Din, the Quiet Grandeur of the Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/opinion/after-mr-trumps-din-the-quiet-grandeur-of-the
-courts.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/K9KW-HXH7].
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which I may have disagreed with the bottom line. 12 And even in the
specific context of the FISC, it is my view that he wrote the single most
important opinion pushing back against the government in any case of
which we are publicly aware, at least as of this writing. 13 My co-authors
and I have included this opinion in our National Security Law and
Counterterrorism Law casebooks, 14 from which I repeatedly teach and
to which I often cite.
What’s more, no one can dispute that Judge Bates was in a singular
position to speak from personal experience as to the wisdom of the FISA
reform proposals then circulating, informed by both his substantive
experience and his unique administrative role. Substantively, Judge
Bates had just finished his stint as the presiding judge of the FISC and,
as such, was in as good a position as anyone to assess the virtues and
vices of the proposed reforms—especially those that might affect
litigation before the FISC. Administratively, he was also serving at that
time as Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (the
“AO”), which made him the Secretary of the Judicial Conference of the
United States—the official policy voice of the federal judiciary. 15
Thus, as he explained in his January 2014 letter to Congress
concerning one of the early versions of what would become the USA
FREEDOM Act:
Traditionally, the views of the Judiciary on legislative matters
are expressed through the Judicial Conference of the United
States, for which I serve as Secretary. However, because the
matters at issue here relate to special expertise and experience of
only a small number of judges on two specialized courts, the
Conference has not at this time been engaged to deliberate on
them. In my capacity as Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, I have responsibility for facilitating the
administration of the federal courts and, furthermore, the Chief
Justice of the United States has requested that I act as a liaison
for the Judiciary on matters concerning the Foreign Intelligence

12. One of my first law review articles after I entered the academy was the culmination of a larger
project initially prompted by Judge Bates’s 2004 ruling in Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28
(D.D.C. 2004). See Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and
Article III, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1532–34 (2007) (discussing Abu Ali).
13. See [Caption Redacted], [Docket No. Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011).
14. See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 686–99 (6th ed. 2016); STEPHEN
DYCUS ET AL., COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 314–27 (3d ed. 2016).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (setting forth the composition, mission, and powers of the Judicial
Conference).
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Surveillance Act (FISA).[ 16] In considering such matters, I
benefit from having served as Presiding Judge of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). 17
In other words, Judge Bates was, at least at first, exceedingly careful
to stress the limited capacity in which he was speaking, even if any
number of his letters’ readers would not have appreciated the nuance. At
the same time, many of the concerns Judge Bates raised in his January
2014 letter were directed at low-hanging fruit and had been overtaken by
more nuanced, subsequent proposals. 18 If Judge Bates had done nothing
more than send the January 2014 letter, it would be very difficult to be
critical of his involvement.
Where I believe Judge Bates began to cross the line between
appropriate and inappropriate involvement was in his second public
letter, dated May 13, 2014. 19 That letter came in response to the bill that
had emerged from the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (a bill that would soon thereafter be passed on the House
floor). 20 In its very first sentence, the May letter, unlike the January
letter, purported to speak far more categorically “[o]n behalf of the
Judicial Branch.” 21 The May letter also referred to all of its concerns in
the plural (“we”)—which, to uninformed readers, certainly could have
given the appearance that the entire federal judiciary (or even just the
FISC or the Judicial Conference) shared Judge Bates’s concerns about
this pending legislation. 22
16. This passage raises a fascinating question unto itself: whether the Chief Justice, who is solely
responsible for appointing judges to the FISC, see 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1) (2012), should have (or
has had) any role in identifying a “liaison for the Judiciary” on matters pertaining thereto. Even if
the work of a specialized court is too specific for the Judicial Conference as a whole, it would surely
avoid potential conflicts if that body, and not the Chief Justice acting on his own authority, were
responsible for delegating any liaison authority.
17. Letter from Hon. John D. Bates, Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to Hon. Dianne
Feinstein, Chairman, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2014), https://fas.org/
irp/news/2014/01/bates.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZWH-NZES].
18. See Steve Vladeck, Judge Bates and FISA Reform, JUST SECURITY (May 20, 2014),
https://www.justsecurity.org/10637/judge-bates-fisa-reform/ [https://perma.cc/DAL4-STLP].
19. Letter from Hon. John D. Bates, Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to Hon. Mike Rogers,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (May 13, 2014), reprinted in H.R. REP.
NO. 113-452, pt. 2, at 41 (2014).
20. The bill to which the May 13 letter was reacting, which was known as the “Manager’s
Amendment to H.R. 3361,” was much weaker than either the original bill or the version Senator
Leahy would subsequently introduce in the Senate. See Steve Vladeck, The USA FREEDOM Act
and a FISA “Special Advocate,” LAWFARE (May 20, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/usafreedom-act-and-fisa-special-advocate [https://perma.cc/8ECD-ESLB].
21. Letter from Hon. John D. Bates to Hon. Mike Rogers, supra note 19.
22. Id.
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Despite his broad language, it was already apparent that Judge Bates
was not speaking even for his current or former colleagues on the FISC,
two of whom had, the previous summer, publicly endorsed the very
reforms Judge Bates criticized (including in a New York Times op-ed). 23
Regardless of who had the better of those arguments, the disagreements
made obvious what many had thus far suspected: that whomever Judge
Bates was speaking for, it was not his colleagues on the FISC or the
federal judiciary more generally.
But the real misstep was the third public letter, transmitted on August
5, 2014, in response to the Leahy bill. 24 Notwithstanding the clear
evidence that his views were not universally shared, Judge Bates opened
by stating, “I am writing to express, on behalf of the Judiciary, several
important concerns about the [Leahy bill].” 25 Like the May letter, the
August letter used plural nouns to refer to each of its objections. 26 And
whereas the May letter proposed three specific (and fairly modest)
adjustments to the bill as it then stood, 27 the August letter went well
beyond concerns over how the reforms would affect the FISC. 28 Indeed,
the August missive even objected to one proposal on the ground that it
might “prompt the government not to pursue potentially valuable
intelligence-gathering activities under FISA.” 29
In his article, Professor Anderson summarizes Judge Bates’s critiques
as “an administrative complaint,” 30 which only merges with policy
discussions because of the unique nature of specialized courts’ (like the
FISC’s) jurisdiction. 31 To me, this undersells Judge Bates’s role. In fact,
Judge Bates was offering substantive objections that, in at least some
cases, had nothing whatsoever to do with the FISC. Furthermore, he
purported to do so “on behalf of the judiciary,” despite the existence of

23. See James G. Carr, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/opinion/a-better-secret-court.html
[https://perma.cc/LP7UUP3R]. The other FISC judge to comment publicly was Judge James Robertson, speaking at a July
2013 workshop hosted by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. See Pema Levy, Former
FISA Court Judge: Secret Court Needs Reform, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 9, 2013),
http://www.ibtimes.com/former-fisa-court-judge-secret-court-needs-reform-1338671 [https://perma.
cc/L8CE-ZTDU].
24. Letter from Hon. John D. Bates to Hon. Patrick Leahy, supra note 5.
25. Id. at 1.
26. See id. at 1–7.
27. Letter from Hon. John D. Bates to Hon. Mike Rogers, supra note 19.
28. See id. at 4.
29. Id.
30. Anderson, supra note 1, at 450.
31. See id. at 450–51.
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contrary public views from several of his colleagues—and no formal
statement from the Judicial Conference.32 As Judge Bates continued to
publicly respond to different proposals as the legislative process
unfolded, it became increasingly difficult to view him as an impartial
observer of legislation that might impact his judicial function, instead of
as the de facto leader of the opposition to the reform movement.
It is possible, of course, that other examples of judicial lobbying, even
in the context of specialized courts, can be painted with a similarly
problematic brush. That being said, the FISA reform debate was unique
in one last respect: insofar as part of the reform conversation was
focused on the FISC itself, it was provoked by concerns about the
inadequacies of the judicial review provided by the FISC. Whatever the
merits of the charge that the pre-Snowden FISC was a “rubber stamp”
for the government, the animating idea behind a special advocate was to
increase the quality and robustness of the litigation before the FISC. This
would not only ensure that the government would be better held to
account for potentially erroneous legal interpretations—as civil liberties
groups demanded—but also would lend even greater legitimacy to
decisions that upheld the authorities the government was seeking. This
latter point may have a lot to do with why the Obama administration
openly supported the idea of a special advocate 33—and why it had
apparently signed off on the language to that effect in the Leahy bill
(which Judge Bates found so problematic).
In that regard, the true concern that arises from Judge Bates’s
involvement is that, in many ways, it only underscored the imperative of
the reform he was critiquing—a reform specifically designed and
intended to improve the quality of decision-making by (and the
perceived impartiality of) the FISC. After all, as I wrote in response to
the August letter, “[H]ow much can we really trust the FISC to check the
Executive Branch on its own if its judges are so invested in defending
the Executive Branch from reforms to which the Executive Branch does
not even object?” 34 Judged against this example, concerns about Federal
Circuit judges commenting on proposed reforms to patent law, or Ninth
Circuit judges expressing support for or opposition to proposals to split
their court, seem to pale in comparison—and rightly so.

32. See Vladeck, supra note 8.
33. See Ackerman, supra note 6.
34. Vladeck, supra note 8.
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In the Wall Street Journal article that publicly disclosed Judge Bates’s
August letter (which had apparently been leaked), 35 my good friend and
Lawfare colleague Ben Wittes summarized the Leahy bill (the subject of
Judge Bates’s critiques) as a “compromise involving the Obama
administration, civil-liberties groups, industry and a lot of senators, but
[one that] didn’t involve the courts. The courts are dissenters from this
compromise.” 36 Of course, we already knew better—even by then—that
“the courts,” including the FISC, were not in fact speaking with one
voice. 37
But any doubt on that front was put to rest just over one week later in
a letter sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee by Judge Alex Kozinski,
then the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit. 38 Noting that he was writing
“to clear up any misunderstanding that might arise as to whose views the
[August 5 Bates] letter represents,” 39 Judge Kozinski went out of his
way to stress that the matter had not been brought up before the Judicial
Conference, and that, “having given the matter little consideration, and
having had no opportunity to deliberate with the other members of the
Judicial Conference, I have serious doubts about the views expressed by
Judge Bates.” 40 Thus, “[i]nsofar as Judge Bates’s August 5th letter may
be understood as reflecting my views, I advise the Committee that this is
not so.” 41
Given the identity of the author, 42 the rebuke of Judge Bates was
actually rather mild. But the point was made—and widely reported in

35. Indeed, two of the three Bates letters were only disclosed after the fact—the May letter
because the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence appended it to the Committee
Report on the bill, H.R. REP. NO. 113-452, pt. 2 (2014), and the August letter because it was leaked
to the Wall Street Journal, infra note 36. Had Judge Bates, whether in his capacity as the Director of
the AO or the Secretary of the Judicial Conference, circulated these letters to colleagues and
received their acquiescence (or objections) before sending them, I dare say it would have changed
the tenor of the entire episode.
36. Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Judge Blasts Bill to Revamp Surveillance, WALL STREET J.
(Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-judge-blasts-bill-to-revamp-surveillance-1407367
365 (quoting Ben Wittes).
37. See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text.
38. See Letter from Hon. Alex Kozinski to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, supra note 10.
39. Id. at 1.
40. Id. at 2.
41. Id.
42. For one of the more pointed examples of Judge Kozinski’s rather blunt writing style, see Alex
Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 108 YALE L.J. 835 (1999) (book review).

Vladeck_FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

THE WARS OF THE JUDGES

3/25/2017 12:05 PM

9

both major newspapers and popular legal blogs. 43 The breadth of the
coverage was all the more noteworthy given that it came in the middle of
August, the time of year when official Washington customarily absconds
from both the capital and its political battles. Indeed, the Bates-Kozinski
affair provoked public responses from one sitting and one former federal
district judge. The former, Judge Richard Kopf, wrote that “Bates has
been ‘bench slapped’ by Kozinski, and there is ‘trouble in
paradise.’ . . . No matter how one expresses it, this dispute is
extraordinary (and perhaps unsettling) for those who ‘are inside
baseball.’” 44 The latter, Judge Nancy Gertner, wrote the following for
the National Law Journal:
There are real concerns when a judge—particularly one charged
only with administrative responsibilities—purports to speak for
the entire bench on proposed legislation. It runs the risk of
compromising judicial independence, forecasting the courts’
position on cases that could come before individual judges after
the legislation is enacted. For example, while Bates’ letter hints
darkly that there are “fundamental constitutional difficulties”
with the Senate bill, he concedes—somewhat disingenuously—
that he should not address them in any detail because they may
one day be presented to the courts. 45
As these pieces suggest, the episode was widely noted, and in no way
enhanced public perception of the federal courts in general, or the FISC
in particular. And that, to me, is perhaps the most important takeaway
from both the FISA reform example and Professor Anderson’s broader
thesis: at the end of the day, the real casualty of inappropriate judicial
lobbying is judicial credibility. And thanks to President Trump’s

43. See, e.g., David McAfee, 9th Circ. Chief Judge Not On Board with Attack on NSA Bill,
LAW360 (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/569691/9th-circ-chief-judge-not-onboard-with-attack-on-nsa-bill [https://perma.cc/F8GG-TB6N]; Tim Cushing, Judge Kozinski Calls
Out Former FISC Judge John Bates for Claiming to Speak for the Entire Judicial Branch,
TECHDIRT (Aug. 22, 2014), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140822/09575528293/justicekozinski-writes-letter-to-senators-calling-out-former-fisc-judge-john-bates-claiming-to-speakentire-judicial-branch.shtml [https://perma.cc/2D7W-NA3W]; Joe Patrice, Non-Sequiturs: 08.21.14,
ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 21, 2014), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/08/non-sequiturs-08-21-14/
[https://perma.cc/2XKW-2VSA].
44. See Richard G. Kopf, A Bench Slap Portends Trouble in Paradise, HERCULES AND THE
UMPIRE (Aug. 22, 2014), https://wednesdaywiththedecentlyprofane.me/2014/08/22/a-bench-slapportends-trouble-in-paradise [https://perma.cc/NQ5K-HQ7H].
45. See Nancy Gertner, Op-Ed: Who Speaks for the Bench About Surveillance?, NAT’L L.J. (Sept.
15, 2014), http://www.nancygertner.com/news/op-ed-who-speaks-bench-about-surveillance [https://
perma.cc/PTR6-S8AM].

Vladeck_FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

10

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

3/25/2017 12:05 PM

[Vol. 92:1

repeated attacks on the courts, 46 judicial credibility is an invaluable
commodity that is perhaps more important today than it has been for
generations. Although assessments of how particular lobbying episodes
impact judicial credibility will be necessarily subjective, that does not
mean that they are incapable of being compared to each other.
By that yardstick, the central problem with the lobbying in the context
of the FISA reform episode was not the substance of the objections—
inappropriate though they may have been. Nor was it their persistence or
timing. Rather, there was just something surreal in the specter of a judge
purporting to speak on behalf of his colleagues—and then being publicly
chastised for having done so once they found out.
* * *
Perhaps surprisingly, August 2014 was not the last time views
purporting to be of “the judiciary” were offered (and relied upon) as part
of the FISA reform conversation. On the eve of the USA FREEDOM
Act’s passage in June 2015, Senate Republicans proposed an amendment
that would have eviscerated the (by-then dramatically weakened)
“special advocate” provision. 47 In a Senate staff memorandum, the
amendment was described as being “responsive to the judiciary’s
continual opposition to the amicus structure of the USA Freedom Act,”
as manifested in “a letter to Congress from the director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.” 48 That letter, it turned out,
had been prepared by James Duff—Judge Bates’s successor as Director
of the AO. As Director Duff noted in a footnote:
These views have been formulated through consultation with the
presiding judges of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts
(and now with Judge Bates, a former presiding judge of the
FISC). For the sake of convenience, throughout the [sic] this
letter the terms “we” and “our” are used to describe these
institutional perspectives. Because the matters at issue here
relate to special expertise and experience of only a small number
of judges on two specialized courts, the Judicial Conference has
not been engaged to deliberate on them. 49

46. See After Mr. Trump’s Din, the Quiet Grandeur of the Courts, supra note 11.
47. See Steve Vladeck, Amendment 1451, the “Judiciary,” and FISA Reform, LAWFARE (June 2,
2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/amendment-1451-judiciary-and-fisa-reform-0 [https://perma.
cc/2DBQ-YW7Q].
48. See id.
49. Letter from James C. Duff, Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to Hon. Devin Nunes,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, at 1 n.1. (May 4, 2015),
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By that point, given the very public spectacle Judge Kozinski’s letter
sparked, even the mere insinuation of consensus among the judiciary
bordered on intentional misrepresentation. Whether Director Duff was to
blame, or the authors of the Senate memo, or both, the reality was that
the letter’s critiques simply represented the views of a cherry-picked
group of former FISC judges. And the letter was even more problematic
in that it failed to even acknowledge the myriad procedural or
substantive objections that the previous letters had provoked. Perhaps for
those reasons (or maybe just sheer exhaustion), the amendment failed.
But even as Judge Bates and those of similar views lost this particular
battle, they won the war; what Congress finally enacted in the USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015 was remarkably close to what Judge Bates had
clamored for in his three public letters. Thus, for example, the
transparency provisions were diluted to the point of toothlessness, and
the special advocate was reduced to merely a court-appointed amicus
curiae (with the FISC retaining the power to decline to even appoint
such an amicus whenever it deemed such an appointment unnecessary).
Moreover, there was no mechanism for the amicus to appeal adverse
rulings to the FISA Court of Review. 50
Thus, when all was said and done, Judge Bates got what he wanted,
despite (or even especially because of) the fact that the judiciary did not
necessarily agree—even as he purported to speak on its behalf. In that
context, especially, such aggressive and problematic judicial lobbying
should concern all of us, especially Judge Bates’s colleagues.

https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2015/06/Duff-Letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VL2T-UT37].
50. See Vladeck, supra note 20.

